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 Offers on appeal: When might costs be awarded on the indemnity basis? 
How is the Court of Appeal likely to view costs orders if an offer to settle is rejected, 
particularly if the appeal outcome is less favourable to the appellant? Report by Sheryl 
Jackson. 
Appeals – offer by respondent to settle appeal – offer not accepted – outcome plainly less 
favourable to appellant – whether costs should be awarded on indemnity basis – UCPR 
chapter 9 part 5 inapplicable – Defamation Act 2005 inapplicable – whether refusal to 
accept offer unreasonable 
In Roberts v Prendergast [2013] QCA 89 the respondent had offered to settle the appeal, 
purporting to make the offer under Chapter 9 Part 5 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 
1999 (Qld) (UCPR). 
Differing views were expressed in the Court of Appeal regarding the impact in the 
circumstances of the offer to settle, with the majority concluding that the appellant should 
pay the respondent’s costs on the standard basis. 
Facts 
At first instance the plaintiff, who was the respondent on the appeal, was awarded 
judgment in the amount of $54,375, comprised of $50,000 general damages for defamation, 
and interest of $4,375. The appellant filed a notice of appeal on 25 June 2012. The appeal 
was against the damages assessed only. 
On 18 July 2012 the respondent made an offer to settle the appeal, on the basis that he 
would accept $29,999 (inclusive of interest), with the appellant to pay the respondent’s 
standard costs of the appeal. The offer purported to be made under Chapter 9 Part 5 of the 
UCPR. Neither the offer, nor the letter to the appellant’s solicitors enclosing the offer, was 
marked ‘without prejudice’. The document did not state that the respondent reserved the 
right to rely on it on the issue of costs. The offer was open for acceptance for 15 days but 
was not accepted. 
The appeal was heard in November 2012, and was dismissed. 
The issue was whether the appellant’s failure to accept the respondent’s offer to 
compromise the appeal justified an order that the respondent’s costs of the appeal be 
assessed on the indemnity basis. 
Analysis 
Gotterson JA explained that the source of power for awarding costs was r766(1)(d) of the 
UCPR, which confers a wide discretion on the Court of Appeal to make an order as to costs 
of an appeal as it considers appropriate. His Honour noted that the court, in considering this 
rule, said in Tector v FAI General Insurance Company Limited [2001] 2 Qd R 463 that the 
ordinary rule that costs are to be recovered on the standard basis should only be departed 
from where the conduct of the party against whom the order is sought is “plainly 
unreasonable”. 
His Honour also referred to similar observations in Deepcliffe Pty Ltd v The Council of the 
City of Gold Coast [2001] QCA 396, where the Court of Appeal spoke of the requirement that 
there be “some unusual or differentiating feature about the case” in order to justify a 
departure from the standard basis. 
Gotterson JA also stated that the decisions of Tector and Deepcliffe establish that the 
provisions of Chapter 9 Part 5 UCPR, relating to offers to settle, do not apply to proceedings 
in the Court of Appeal, so that the procedure ensuring the award of indemnity costs in r360 
was inapplicable to the appeal. He said the making of a Calderbank offer to a party to an 
appeal who does not accept it but fails to achieve a better outcome, could nevertheless 
have relevance to, but not a decisive influence on, whether there ought to be a departure 
from the ordinary rule. This principle applied in the circumstances here since, although the 
letter and offer did not contain some of the characteristic features of a Calderbank offer and 
did not refer expressly to Calderbank principles, it was unquestionable that they conveyed 
terms for settlement of the appeal that were capable of acceptance. 
One of the matters relied on by the respondent related to the comparatively modest 
amount of the damages awarded. Since general damages were at large and there was a 
dearth of comparable awards which may offer guidance, there was room for a difference of 
opinion about the range within which an award which bears an appropriate and rational 
relationship to the harm sustained by the injured party might fall. 
Accordingly, his Honour did not regard it as plainly unreasonable for the appellant either to 
initiate a challenge to the quantum of the general damages award made at trial or to 
continue the challenge once the offer had been made, even though the challenge ultimately 
failed. 
The respondent also sought to draw an analogy with s40 of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld). 
Subsection 40(2) deals specifically with costs of proceedings brought where there is an 
unreasonable failure to make or accept a settlement offer. Gotterson JA noted this provision 
does not, in its terms, apply to appeals, and found that it should not be given an application 
by analogy to appeals. 
As he was not persuaded that the appellant had acted plainly unreasonably, or that there 
are any special or unusual features of the appeal which would justify departure from the 
ordinary rule, Gotterson JA concluded that the appellant should pay the respondent’s costs 
of the appeal on the standard basis. 
Fraser JA agreed with the order proposed by Gotterson JA. His Honour also agreed that 
although the rules in Chapter 9, Part 5 of the UCPR do not apply to appeals, the offer here 
impliedly foreshadowed to the appellant that an application might be made for costs to be 
assessed on the indemnity basis and was therefore relevant. 
His Honour regarded the authorities as establishing that costs should be assessed on the 
indemnity basis only when the conduct of a party on the appeal has been “plainly 
unreasonable”, or where there were other “special or unusual features” to justify a 
departure from the usual course. He noted, however, that some decisions have adopted the 
test of unreasonableness without reference to the adverb “plainly”. In determining whether 
the appellant acted unreasonably in not accepting the respondent’s offer here, he said the 
relevant considerations included: 
(a) the stage of the proceeding at which the offer was received 
(b) the time allowed to the offeree to consider the offer 
(c) the extent of the compromise offered 
(d) the offeree’s prospects of success, assessed as at the date of the offer 
(e) the clarity with which the terms of the offer were expressed, and 
(f) whether the offer foreshadowed an application for indemnity costs in the event 
of the offeree’s rejecting it. 
His Honour’s conclusion on these considerations, and with particular regard to the offeree’s 
prospects of success assessed at the date of the offer, was that the appellant’s failure to 
accept the offer was neither “unreasonable” nor “plainly unreasonable”. His Honour also 
agreed with Gotterson JA’s reasons for concluding that neither the combination of the 
modest amount of the damages award and the prospects of the appellant’s case on appeal, 
nor the suggested analogy in appeals with the provision applicable at trials in s40 of the 
Defamation Act 2005, amounted to special or unusual features such as to justify assessment 
of the respondent’s costs on the indemnity basis. 
The Chief Justice dissented, and would have ordered that the appellant pay the 
respondent’s costs on the indemnity basis. His Honour distinguished Tector v FAI General 
Insurance Company Ltd [2001] 2 Qd R 463, on the basis that on the facts at hand the offer 
was made early in the piece and there was a large difference in amounts. In these 
circumstances his Honour regarded the appellant’s implied rejection of the offer to settle as 
unreasonable, to the point where the appeal costs should be assessed on the indemnity 
basis. 
In relation to the principles to be applied, the Chief Justice said (at [7]): 
“An object of the standard/indemnity regime, both at first instance and on appeal, is 
to encourage litigants to take a reasonable, rather than ‘bullish’, approach to 
proceedings. The public substantially foots the bill for this process. The court, by its 
costs orders, should ensure that where litigants act unreasonably, they suffer a 
consequence, in the hope that more expeditious treatment will in the end 
consequently be available for others.” 
Comment 
The judges in the Court of Appeal all agreed in general terms on the test to be applied in 
determining whether the costs should be ordered on the indemnity basis. The difference in 
views related to the circumstances in which a refusal to accept a settlement offer, which 
was not ultimately bettered on the appeal, should be regarded as unreasonable. 
Clearly there remains a prospect of an award of the costs of an appeal on the indemnity 
basis, and this should encourage parties in similar circumstances to make reasonable offers 
of compromise. A very recent example is Stevens v Limbada [2013] QDC 82. In that case 
Kingham DCJ was persuaded that the aggregation of factors in the case, including the 
appellant's rejection of an offer to settle, was plainly unreasonable. The appellant was 
ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal and the cross-appeal, to be assessed on 
the indemnity basis. 
As Fraser JA noted in this judgment, there are also other incentives for respondents to make 
offers to settle an appeal. Had the court in this case substantially reduced the amount of the 
trial judgment, the appellant would in the ordinary course expect to be awarded on the 
standard basis. However, if the reduction of the award did not extend below the amount of 
the respondent’s offer, the appellant’s failure to accept the offer could have been taken into 
account in favour of making a costs order which was more favourable to the respondent, 
whether or not the appellant’s failure to accept the offer was or was not unreasonable. 
The offer should not refer to the provisions of Chapter 9 part 5 of the UCPR, which do not 
apply to appeals, but rather should clearly foreshadow an application for indemnity costs if 
the offer is rejected. 
 
